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Freedom. of Communication
Since freedom of communication is one
of the fundamental human rights, it is not
surprising that it has been incorporated
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In the December
1966 edition of the Notre Dame Lawyer,
an analysis is made of the effect natural
law standards have had on the Supreme
Court decisions in this area and an
attempt is made to establish standards
for use in future cases.
The Supreme Court's incorporation of
the first amendment freedoms into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has resulted from a determination
by the Court that these rights are inherent
natural rights of man, being basic not
only to one form of government "but also
basic to the dignity of the human 'being."
Thus, these rights are inviolable .'by, state
government action.
The important role of the "tights of
speech, press and assembly in a form
of, government such as ours, wher6 the
goVernment is"respongible to .the people,
'has'not been overlooked' by the Supreme
•(ouA."" Man's 'fulfilment 'of his natural
"ten'denrcy to be a political or social :animal
'wiltP be attained by hIis participahion in
"g.erimnen. i This parfidipationf 'seems to
fi-v6 'its best effect 'in 'a representative
form of government, aid' 'as the auth6r
puts it: "The effectiveness of representa-

tive government rests in part upon freedom of communication, which the Court
has undertaken to protect against state
invasion."
In order to provide guidelines for the
application of the general principle of
inclusion of these rights into the due
'process clause of the fourteenth amendment, to specific cases, the author suggests
four tests.
Does the claimed right to freedom of
speech and press actually promote the
exercise of that right in all circumstances?
The author feels that not all claims of
the exercise of one of these rights should
be acknowledged.
There are instances
when such a claim would lead to a diminution of the exercise of the right which
is claimed. It seems that such a situation
occurs when one person, exercising his
right to freedom of speech,, unnecessarily
interferes with the right of'someone else
to express his views, as for' example,
where hecklers in a crowd interfere with
a 'speaker.
Does the climed right tb 'freedom of
speech and press unnecessarily interfere
with the exercise of equally 'important or
mbre important' rights? The author finds
clear indications of a hierarchy of rights
in the order used in' the fifth and" fourteenth amendments-life, liberty and property.' The superiority "of the right to
life, he -contends, is inplicit in. Justice
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Holmes' well-known condemnation of the
man who would falsely shout fire in a
crowded theater, resulting in a panic
which would endanger the lives of others.
The author regrets the fact that the Supreme Court has, however, never clearly
indicated those rights to which the first
amendment rights are superior. Thus, the
indication seems to be that they are
superior to all others. The result has
been that at least one right, the right to
privacy in the home, has been curtailed
by holdings of the Supreme Court invalidating laws which attempted to prohibit
house-to-house solicitation for religious
purposes. The author contends that the
concept of a hierarchy of rights is extremely dangerous and inappropriate without specific enumeration of the preferential rights.
Does the claimed right to freedom of
speech and press accord with the customs

of the country? Custom is often accorded
the force of law and the Court should
accord it due notice and respect when
developing its rules of law. An excellent example of such use of customary
standards is reflected in the Supreme
Court's use of the "contemporary community standards" in determinations of
obscenity. Disregard of established custom should occur only when it is violative
of the rights of some people and where
the common good will be advanced by a
new rule.
Does the claimed right of freedom of
speech and press conflict with the com-

mon good? All individual rights may be
exercised only with due regard for the
rights of others. Each person in society
must subordinate himself to the common
good of the society. This common good
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is, of course, generally the same as the
"individual good" of the people involved.
The guidelines proposed by the author
seem helpful in determining the validity
of claims to the exercise of the rights of
freedom of speech and press. Careful
study of these claims is necessary to
assure the continued, unimpeded existence of these rights. The rights of the
individual must continually be balanced
with the rights of the society in which he
lives and the burden is on the Supreme
Court continually to define the application of these freedoms in concrete cases.
Canon Law
The impact of the Second Vatican
Council has been readily apparent in the
liturgical reforms resulting from it, but
it is interesting to note the more fundamental and far-reaching effects it may
have on the institutional Church. In this
respect, a recent issue of The Jurist (January 1967) presents two articles, one
dealing with the question of revision of
the Code of Canon Law and the second
dealing with the possibility of revising the
ecclesiastical law of prior censorship by
reference to the approach to this question taken by American constitutional
law.
In the first of these articles, "Canon
Law: Pluralism or Uniformity?", Father
Jordan Bishop, O.P., seeks to answer the
question whether, in the post-conciliar
Church, a "universal" Code of Canon
Law, similar to that of 1918, is possible.
Father Bishop takes as his basic premise
the value of institutional decentralization,
a possibility which he sees as one of the
more important effects of the Council.
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He makes clear that the prospects for
such decentralization are dimmed considerably if a universal centralized Code
is again superimposed upon the forces of
diversity and native juridical traditions.
Furthermore, Father Bishop argues, the
uniformity of a centralized juridical code,
such as the present Code, is often more
apparent than real since variations in cultural values often play a significant role
in the way in which the law is observed.
The author cites the divergence in observing Sunday Mass requirements in Ireland
and France and the overwhelming effects
of local custom on the freedom of parties
to marry in Latin America as pertinent
indicia of the very real effect of diversity
upon the uniformity sought by the Code.
So too, he argues, native juridical traditions, exemplified by the Latin American
pre-Code local councils, should be taken
into account to the extent that ecclesiastical law would be expressed in terms of
these traditions.
Father Bishop's central appeal is for a
body of ecclesiastical law directed toward
achieving unity rather than rigid uniformity. His argument is couched in extremely practical terms, i.e., in the face of the
obvious fact of cultural diversity, a revised, but still uniform codification, is
impossible unless the idea of decentralization is to be discarded, a possibility
which Father Bishop deems unacceptable.
Even more to the point, he makes the
argument that even if this goal were
discarded, the attempt at universal legislation would face the same difficulties in
achieving uniformity that it has faced in
the past.
If what is sought is the abandonment
of what Father Bishop considers the out-

moded rigidity of the present Code, the
question very clearly arises as to what
form its replacement should take. The
solution he presents would establish a
body of law which directs its attention to
unity by limiting itself to outlining basic
institutions whose particular manifestations
could be attuned to diversity by means
of local legislation. The benefits to be
gained by such a course would be found
primarily in increasing the relevancy of
the Church to the particular conditions
of varying areas of the world and thereby
facilitate an increased involvement of laymen in the administrative affairs of the
Church. Father Bishop does not ignore
possible dangers in this approach, but
contends that such dangers as schism can
be coped with effectively and quickly in
a world of almost instant communication
and that there is a greater danger in
allowing the present negative attitude toward Canon Law to continue.
Father Bishop's point is well taken
and it exemplifies the positive effect which
Vatican II can have on the Church, in
contrast to what are the all too often
negative implications attributed to the
Council. His argument recognizes the
fundamental truth of the proposition that
law, to be relevant and effective, must
attune itself to the time and circumstances
in which it is to operate and that, if it
does otherwise, it risks dooming itself to
indifference and even positive breach.
With particular regard to Canon Law,
Father Jordan's emphasis on diversity as
a positive value which should be appreciated by and reflected in Canon Law
is a welcome manifestation of the openness which should increasingly character-
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ize the relationship of the Church to the
worjd in which it ,operates.
This appreciation of, and willingness
to make use of, diversity is reflected' in
the article entitled, "Prior Censorship and
Human Rights," in the same issue of The
Jurist, :written by Father William J. Nessel,.. O.SF.S. Father Nessel begins with
an analysis of the treatment of prior
censorship by the United States Supreme
Court, operating in a pluralistic society,
in an'-attempt to derive some guidelines
which might be useful to those directly
concerned with a possible revision of the
ecclesiastical law of prior censorship. .He
begins with a reference to 'John Milton
and his well-known protest against prior,
restraints -in the Areopagitica as evidence
of the long history of this type of censorship. Turning then to the American
experience, he points out that, although
the Supreme Court has steadily increased
its protection of freedom of expression,
it continues to uphold narrowly defined
legi lation requiring the submission of
movies to a censor prior to public showing. Citing cases such as Near v. Minnesota and Lovell.. v. Griffin, . Father
Nessel points out that both the publication and distribution. of literature enjoy
constitutional protection in the United
States, especially in terms of protecting
against arbitrary action by executive auth.ority, exercising some form of discretionary power. The protection, however,' is not absolute in that it does not
extend to publications deemed "obscene,"
difficult though it may'be to arrive at a
standard for obscenity. ' The author then
develops the law 'in this area of. defining
obscenity' and emphasizes the necessity, of
seeking to strike .a balance between free
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expression and limitations on such freedom to prevent its abuse. This, in turn,
raises the question of who is to determine
what is protected and what is beyond the
vale of protection.
He notes that, in
the United States, the legislature has
traditionally exercised this function but
has more recently come to be displaced
in large measure by the judiciary and
this is compared with the Canon Law
system where this power continues to
reside in administrative bodies, the Roman
and diocesan curial officials and religious
superiors. Father Nessel summarizes the
American experience in terms of allowing
the. greatest. possible latitude in free expression consonant with the maintenance
of- good order in society and notes that
the inevitable effect of such an attitude
is to place increasing responsibility on
individuals and private institutions to assure that such freedom is used in the
best interests of society.
I
In attempting to apply this background
to the specific issue of prior censorship
in the Church, reference, is first made
to the fact that the pronouncements of
Vatican II in relation to religious freedom
and the rights of women are but a recognition within the Church of sociological
and political developments, which have
already taken place in the civil, sphere.
In this light, the -author argues that the
same line of reasoning .should. be. applied
to prior censorship since he contends -that
applicable Canon Law simply: reflects, the.
thinking of an ,earlier .,age .and is no
longer in harmony: with twentieth-century
thinking on human -liberty. While recog-_
nizing that the relation of a citizen to
his. government -and society is' not identical with .tbat .,Of the, -individual ,to-. the,

IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS.

Church and its hierarchy, he maintains
that in both, the.. individual retains the'
basic human. right of free speech, limited
to some extent in 'the former relation, but
limited to a far greater extent in the latter relation.. In both, there is a recognition that what is.fundamental to the
existence of that society must take precedence over the individual's liberty. It. is
at this point that Father Nessel urges
that the Church refer to the 'American
experience so as to profit by its refusal
to permit infringement on this, freedom
by arbitrary action. The key points of
reference are minimal restraint, clear legislative delineation of the scope of such
restraint, minimal' discretion in applying
such restraint, opportunity to contest the
application of the restraint and a right to
appeal both the application and the very
existence of the restraint. In a sense,
these comprise the elements of the proposition that an idea should be allowed to
fight for its survival in free competition
with other ideas. It is this proposition
which Father Nessel urges the Church
to accept, especially with regArd to 'scholarship. He contends that censorship all too
often prevents such competition among
ideas either because the idea is considered
too novel or because the censor is unqualified to i'make 'an informed judgment.
He further contends that the underlying
attitude of" protectiveness, while perhaps
justified in a less literate age, is simply
unnecessary in an age of general education. There is, of course, risk involved
in' such' olenn~ss- but' the author contends that such risk is -but an essential
part of the human condition and'can be
reduced by'.. further . educating 'the individual. so. that he is able to 'cope with

ideas. The risk is' also reduced, he
maintains, by the fact that error can be
coanteracted by truth in that there will be
other scholars ready and able to demonstrate error.
Father Nessel concludes that what is
needed is an abrogation of the law requiting ecclesiastical approval before publication and that the presumption be in
favor of the individual, not the institution,
so as 'to minimize the possibility'that a
valuable idea might be stifled and the
Church thereby be 'deprived of whatever
benefit that idea might provide. In 'this
regard, Father Nessel's article is closely
attuned to. the attitude expressed by Father
Bishop in more general -terms in the precedi'ng article. Father Nessel's article presents a specific application of the idea
that the Church should draw on cultural
diversity to improve its own institutional
framework and; specifically, should be
willing to adapt the positive achievements
of the civil law to its own juridical framework. In the',matter of censorship, the
Church, as Father Nessel points out, is
mechanically. following legislation based
on thinking which has been discarded and
replaced in large measure by civil law.
As with the Code of Canon Law in general, the Church, thereby risks irrelevancy
to the conditions' and needs of the world
in which it seeks to assert itself. 'To
assert that the Church should seek"'to
apply American constitutional law is not
to say that it must subject itself to it,
but only that it consider its relevance- to,
and reflectibn of, modern thinking on the
question of the human freedom of expression and seek to benefit from it. If
it does not, can it claim to have a meaningful voice in human affairs in a culture
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wherein the civil law grants extensive freedom and the Church retains its policy of
restriction? Furthermore, the very existence of the censorship process undoubtedly stifles expression by encouraging discussion only within safe boundaries and
may even stifle the desire to publicize
thought in the first instance. The danger
in this is that it can deprive the Church
of questions which may provide needed
answers and unfairly impose upon the
loyalty and sincerity of the very persons
who could provide such answers. The
questions are important and the fact that
they are being discussed in such periodicals as The Jurist indicates that Vatican
II is having a liberalizing effect and, hopefully, that effect will take practical form
in the revision of the Canon Law.
Pax Romana
In a past issue of the Catholic Lawyer
(Spring 1965), the Editor outlined the
purposes and goals of the International
Secretariat of Lawyers of Pax Romana in
the hope that lawyers in the United States
might have an opportunity to participate
in its work. As was indicated in that
issue, the Secretariat was circulating a
questionnaire bearing upon the theme of
its fifth international congress, "Law and
Religious Freedom," which provided interested lawyers and laymen an opportunity for participation by responding to
the questionnaire.
In its April 1967 newsletter, the Secretariat announced plans for its sixth international congress to be held in Dakar,
Senegal in December 1968. The theme
of this congress is to be "The Mission of
Christian Lawyers in Developing Countries" and, in order to make preparations
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for the discussions to be held, the Secretariat is again circulating a questionnaire
concerned with two aspects of the theme
topic: the developing countries themselves
and the position, in relation to their problems, of the industrialized nations. The
specific questions are these:
To what extent and by what means can
Christian lawyers
(1) assist the peoples of the developing countries to become conscious
of their traditional values and
promote development which will
respect those values as far as possible?
(2) awaken in everyone a consciousness of justice, a recognition of
the equality of men and fight
against segregation based on race,
religion, sex or social standing?
(3) promote a consciousness of the
common good and service to the
national community as well as the
realization of the community of
local or continental interests and
solidarity between all men?
(4) make public opinion conscious
of the seriousness of problems
in under-developed countries and
make the public conscious of the
duty of the more prosperous communities to gear their surplus
wealth to the service of destitute
communities?
(5) procure the advancement of research work being carried out on
the techniques of international cooperation?
(6) act on governments and international organizations to obtain
from them more vigorous action
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in favor of countries seeking to
develop?

constant reminders that we were out of
step with emerging moral values.

As is certainly clear, the topic is timely
and should provoke interest and response
on the part of lawyers and laymen alike.
For those who would like to express their
interest by responding to the questionnaire, correspondence should be sent to:

Brief, after brief, after brief began to
raise the issue of the unfair treatment
of indigents. It was demonstrated time
after time that poverty disabled a
person from asserting his rights, much
like infancy or idiocy.

MR. G. CASSANO
General Secretary
International Secretariat of Lawyers
of Pax Romana
Via Conciliazione 4d
Rome, Italy
LAW AND POVERTY

Chief Judge David L. Bazelon of the
U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington,
D.C., told LSP lawyers attending a welfare law conference that the way to overcome "conservative tendencies" on the
part of judges is through "constant
pressure."
Addressing the conference conducted
by the National Institute for Education
in Law and Poverty on May 10, he discussed the rationalizations employed "to
keep certain problems out of sight," such
as the legal problems of the poor.
Here are excerpts from his speech:
Lawyers have their own special invisible shields. First of all, as I have already
suggested, they rely on the argument that
somehow certain societal problems should
not, or cannot, be handled by the law.
The second legal method of avoiding
action is to let outmoded or abstract
doctrines keep the real world at bay.
How then were these conservative tendencies overborne? I think the prime
factor was the constant pressure. The

Although we were only too willing to
keep problems out of sight, when our
noses were rubbed in the problems we
had to respond.
And, of course, once some changes
were made, others had to follow. Once
it became clear that the law could do
something to end discrimination against
the poor, the traditional barriers were
down.
If the law could improve
matters, why didn't it?
The old slippery-slope arguments also
began to lose their potency as each
change occurred with only minimal
losses in efficiency.
It soon became clear that if you
stopped philosophizing about what equal
protection did or did not mean, you
realized that poor people simply could
not have a fair trial unless the government provided certain services free.
It was not that the government was
doing more for the poor than for other
people. It was doing the same for everyone. It was insuring everyone a fair
trial. There is, after all, no greater
inequality than the equal treatment of
unequals.
The lesson drawn from the events of
the past two decades is that in the legal
world, at least, the tendency of people
to keep problems out of sight can be
overcome by constant pressure. Rub
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people's noses in the dirt and they will
respond.
And so my advice to you is simply
keep punching. Continue to point out
how the system is really working-how
it really affects real people.
Continue to demonstrate to courts and
legislators alike the tragic results of
the legal consciousness.
Continue to show how legal doctrines
no longer bear any relation to reality,
whether in landlord-tenant laws or holderin-due-course law.
Continue to bring real morality into
the legal consciousness.
You know there was a time when
moral arguments were out of fashion.
But moral arguments backed by the
hard facts about discrimination and
deprivation are still the most potent force
in the world, in the courtroom, in the
legislatures, in the cities.
ABORTION IN ENGLAND

In a recent edition of Quis Custodiet?
(No. 18. 1968), Richard O'Brien examines the provisions of the English
Abortion Act of 1967 and indicates some
of the legal anomalies it may cause. Mr.
O'Brien first summarizes very briefly the
history of the legal treatment of abortion
under the common law and early statutes
in England and concludes that under the
1967 Act, "acts which have since the
beginnings of English law been treated
as criminal, shall not be so, if committed
by . . . a registered medical practitioner,
under circumstances set out" in the Act.
It provides that pregnancy may be terminated if, in the good faith opinions of
two physicians, there is a risk to the life
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of the mother or a risk of injury to her
mental or physical health, or to her existing children, which is greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated. The Act also
provides, however, that the two-physician
requirement need not be met if one physician in good faith believes that termination is immediately necessary to save the
mother's life or to prevent grave permanent injury to her physical or mental
health. Mr. O'Brien describes the Act as
taking a middle ground between absolute
prohibition of abortion and abortion on
demand but argues that it allows "so
much discretion" and its limits are "so
extraordinarily wide" that a layman could
regard rejection of a request for an abortion as unreasonable and a denial of legal
rights.
He finds an additional weak point in
the Act's provision that no one is under
a duty to participate in any treatment
provided for by the Act where his refusal is based on conscientious objections.
The provision's efficacy is removed by
the additional qualification that the "conscience" clause does not affect the person's duty to participate in such treatment
when it is necessary to save life or to
prevent grave permanent injury to the
mental or physical health of the mother.
Mr. O'Brien feels that, in the ordinary
case, the Catholic doctor or nurse could
easily establish such an objection, but
that, for others, it might be more difficult
and he compares the situation to that of
Quakers and others less able to prove
conscientious objection during wartime.
He also speculates that such conscientious refusal might also give rise to civil
liability if the mother claims that con-
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tinued pregnancy caused "grave permanent injury to her physical or mental
health." To the argument that such liability is properly imposed because of the
physician's duty to safeguard life and
health, he answers that this ignores the
very central fact that the fetus itself has
a life which is ignored by this argument.
"To oblige anyone, and especially professional men and women, to choose between what their consciences regard as
killing, and running foul of the law is
unsound policy, dubious ethics and bad
law." In addition, he argues that, even
apart from questions of conscience, the
vague language of the Act imposes a
large risk of civil liability on the physician at the suit of the mother, other
children or of the father such that he will
be highly reluctant to refuse a demanded
abortion.
The most interesting point made in
the article is that of the inherent opposition between the development of the
rights of the fetus for injuries incurred
during pregnancy and the Act's sanctioning the destruction of fetal life itself to
save another's life or even to prevent a
lesser injury to mental or physical health.
Mr. O'Brien points to recent cases in
Canada, South Africa and Massachusetts
which recognized a right of action for
fetal injuries and derives from them a
recognition diametrically opposed to the
necessarily invalued denial of that principle in the Abortion Act. From this, he
draws the further conclusion that this
inherent contradiction could result in the
anomaly of a suit by the child based on
the refusal of the abortion and his consequent birth in a defective physical or

mental state. In effect, this child's suit
would allege that the doctor is liable for
having allowed the child to live to fight
a legal action another day and would
seek damages for not having been killed!
Mr. O'Brien observes that the inevitable effect of such possible developments
will be an inclination toward abortion
and that, when in doubt, the physician
will choose to abort since the Act clearly
indicates that, if its provisions are followed, the physician is unlikely to face
criminal sanctions. His bleak conclusion
is that "we can now confidently await the
Euthanasia Bill."
As does the aforementioned article by
Dr. Hellegers, this article clearly presents
the anomalies of abortion "reform" which
predicates so much on the woman's life
and mental and physical "health", and
ignores the life of the fetus. And, in his
final comment, the author starkly makes
the point that once the value of any life
is cheapened, it threatens all life since
various and sundry interests can be, and
have been, declared sufficient to justify
taking life and they are always posited in
ironically "humane," "sympathetic," or
"social" terms. These and other articles
should awaken some sympathy and
willingness to view the question of abortion from the point of view of the victim
of that abortion, the one person who has
no voice of his own in this entire area.
ABORTION LAW REFORM

In the December, 1967 issue of Catholic Mind, Dr. Andre E. Hellegers presents an interesting examination of the
various justifications put forward by those
advocating reform of present abortion
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laws. Dr. Hellegers' chief point is that
the goals of such reforms are presently
obscure and that, even when they are
isolated, they are demonstrably insufficient to support the proposed reforms.
He begins by pointing out that the present law has two underlying bases: the
moral precept of "Thou shalt not kill"
and the assumption that life begins before
birth. He notes the irony contained in the
fact that, of the three most common justifications for taking human life-war, selfdefense and capital punishment, war and
capital punishment are increasingly being
challenged while, at the same time, liberalization of abortion laws is being
sought. The development, he finds, has
resulted in a redefinition of murder as
the taking of innocent life. Since there
can be no possible imputation of guilt to
a fetus, the justification must be found
elsewhere. Such justification for therapeutic abortion is therefore found in the
precedence of the interests of the mother
over those of the fetus. The "maternal
indications" are not limited to the impending death of the mother since it is
so difficult medically to define the relation between non-performance of the
abortion and the death of the mother.
It is then pointed out that the famous
Bourne case introduced the idea that
maternal death was not a sine qua non
for therapeutic abortion; rather, the required maternal indication could be found
in a threat to the mother's mental stability. Dr. Hellegers then raises the
question whether, in light of the increasing medical practice of aborting in cases
lacking a threat to maternal life, the law
should follow medical practice or wheth-
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er it should remain as a guide to what
medical practices are permissible. He
takes the position that responsibility
should remain in the law, which is sufficiently removed from "the firing line"
to provide a sounder basis for control.
He suggests that changes in the law
would lead to further changes in medical
practice which should bear little or no relation to the solution of the problems to
which the changes are presumably addressed.
As a concrete example of a proposed
change, Dr. Hellegers sets forth Section
230.3 of the Model Penal Code which
would permit a "termination of pregnancy" if the physician believes that continuation of the pregnancy involves substantial risk of grave impairment to the
mother's physical or mental health or
that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defects or where the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.
He notes that the physician's belief need
not be correct, that it need not even be
reasonable and that it is not necessary
that the physician base his belief on medical competence or that he be a specialist.
Citing the percentage of licensed physicians among those convicted of criminal
abortion and the cases of two particularly
active physicians, he points out that the
"believing power" of such individuals
could wreak havoc with the new law. In
addition, he points to the relativity and
subjectivity of such terms as "substantial," "gravely impair" and "mental
health" as the source of what could
amount to justification of almost any
abortion.
Dr. Hellegers then points out that the
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incidence of "psychiatric" maternal indications, despite misleading figures which
are being used, is decreasing in terms of
total pregnancies and that, in fact, all
maternal indications are decreasing. This
leads to the second "justification" for
therapeutic abortions-fetal indications
of congenital defects. He points out that
medical advances are decreasing the
scope of such indications and that they
are, in fact, vanishing and that, therefore,
fetal indications cannot justify an abortion. Obviously, no fetus survives an
abortion and the true basis for this "justification" is parental wishes. They do not
want an "abnormal" child, but there is
no evidence that the fetus does not want
life and it cannot be consulted. Furthermore, Dr. Hellegers points out that there
is no indication that persons born with
congenital anomalies would prefer not to
have been born. He concludes that,
though this justification is comfortably
posited in concern for the fetus, it is
really only a reflection of the parents'
desires.
The third justification involves the
rape and incest situations, also not based
on the precedence of maternal over fetal
life. Here, neither the mother's life nor
that of the fetus is the basis. The child
when born would be normal but the
abortion would kill it. Here, the justification is based on mental strain to the
mother (the precise basis of the Bourne
case). The doctor makes the basic point,
however, that the fact of rape or incest
does not necessarily establish a resulting
mental strain and that something more
than the mere fact of rape or incest
should be required. He suggests that

minimum evidence of such strain could
be shown by the mother's willingness to
consult a physician within five days, especially since this would allow uterine
curettage before implantation.
Such a
procedure, he argues, would be of psychological benefit to the mother, would
be less dangerous and would eliminate
the syndrome of the woman who "rapes
awful easy."
The author also deals with some lesser
justifications: "physicians feel like hypocrites when they perform abortions for
reasons not allowed by present law"
(reply: the physicians' feelings are irrelevant if the law, as it presently stands,
represents a proper concern for the common good); "the wealthy can get an
abortion more easily than the poor, and
this is discrimination" (reply: this is
equivalent to arguing that bigamy laws
should be repealed because the rich, unlike the poor, can go to a Moslem country and marry four wives); "the ethical
values of a minority should not be imposed on the country as a whole" (reply:
if law disregarded ethics and followed
public practice only, the Civil Rights
Laws would never have been written).
Aside from these, Dr. Hellegers feels that
the real basis for the proposed changes
in abortion laws is the claim that there
are some 1,200,000 illegal abortions a
year and that there are a resulting
510,000 annual deaths. If the purpose of
the changes is to legalize those 1,200,000
abortions, Dr. Hellegers argues that, in
that case, any abortion can be justified.
If the purpose is to bring the language
of the law into harmony with present
medical practice, then those illegal abortions will still be illegal, since the pro-
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that illegal
abortions have not in fact decreased as a
result of liberalization. In addition, he
points out, the complications following
abortion-possible sterility and psychological consequences-must be considered
as additional factors weighing against
liberalization. Dr. Hellegers re-emphasizes his primary point that, if the proponents of change are seeking it as a
solution to the problem of illegal abortions, the facts do not bear them out. In
addition, he points to the irony of the
developing law on the rights of the fetus
and the contrary movement for liberalization of abortion laws which would
allow actions which would destroy the
right of the fetus to life itself.
Such articles as Dr. Hellegers' are a
welcome contribution to the dialogue
which must be continually carried on if
the essential moral and legal questions
involved in such areas as abortion are to
be resolved in an informed and unemotional way. Emotionally clouded arguments and justifications must be stripped
of their packaging so that the validity of
contents can be established to the satisfaction of those who are asked to "buy"
them.

posed change would result at most in
perhaps a few thousand more legal abortions. In addition, he challenges the
figures on the number of illegal abortions
and resulting deaths as being based on
rather old and epidemiologically questionable studies and surveys. "No way
has yet been found of obtaining reliable
statistics which would give an exact figure
for the total population." He challenges
the death figures as being "unequivocally
wrong," based as they are on a 1936
study whose internal validity and methodology he challenges.
Even apart from the accuracy of the
numerical estimates, Dr. Hellegers points
out that the European liberalization experience is not at all encouraging and
should give pause to those who view
liberalization as a solution to the problem of illegal abortions. According to
the author, if the European experience
were duplicated in the United States,
there would be two or three million annual abortions and, on the basis of statistical tables presented in his article, he
shows how these figures might seem to
indicate a solution to the problem of
illegal abortions. But, he continues, an
examination of the European statistics on
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